



Trends and Policy Options to Effectively Fight Global Poverty and Hunger

A report prepared for the G20 Task Force for the Establishment
of a Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty





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At the midpoint of the 2030 Agenda progress on most of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the world is off track. Despite substantial progress before 2019, the SDGs related to poverty, inequality and hunger faced a big setback during the COVID-19 pandemic. Global post-pandemic estimates suggest limited and uneven progress. Various intertwined crises are hindering progress. Policymakers must intensify efforts to grow their economies in a sustainable way, while protecting the most vulnerable and increasing resilience to shocks.

Against this backdrop, the Brazilian G20 Presidency proposed the establishment of a Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty and has established a specific G20 Task Force to discuss the task, linking both the Sherpa and Finance tracks of the G20. This note intends to inform the Task Force deliberations, and its efforts towards creating an integrated approach, understanding, and addressing the interlocking causes of hunger and poverty, and bridging the domains of food security, nutrition, social protection, and climate change adaptation.

In line with the Issues Note by the Taskforce for the Establishment of a Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty, the note intends to inform the Global Alliance along the following objectives:

1. Describe main global trends on monetary poverty, inequality, and hunger.
2. Present evidence on policies to sustainably tackle poverty and hunger.
3. Propose a framework for identifying policy priorities and gaps.
4. Present the changing structure of aid flows and its impact on aid effectiveness, and to provide recommendations for the Global Alliance.

1. TRENDS IN POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND FOOD INSECURITY

The COVID-19 pandemic was the largest setback to the reduction in global poverty in at least the past three decades. It has taken three years to get back to a similar level of poverty as before the pandemic.


The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 marked a turning point in the 30-year pursuit of successful poverty reduction.¹ Global poverty had declined from more than one in three persons (38 percent of the global population) in 1990 to less than one in 10 persons (9 percent) by 2022. Global inequality is commonly measured using household income (or consumption) per capita and defined using the Gini index over the entire global population.² The global Gini index fell markedly, from 69.1 in 2000 to 62 in 2019, with the

1. See: <https://pip.worldbank.org/home>.

2. And therefore, populous countries have an outsized influence on the global estimate.

steepest decline occurring in the 2000s. This mostly reflects the rapid growth in mean incomes in populous countries, in particular China and India.

FIGURE 1. Global Poverty Trends 2010-2023, Poverty line USD 2.15 and USD 6.85 a day (2017 PPP—Purchasing Power Parity)



Source: *Poverty and Inequality Platform*.

The pandemic, a broad-based shock to the global economy, triggered the first increase in extreme poverty and inequality in more than two decades. COVID-19 increased extreme poverty in the world, as measured by the international poverty line of USD 2.15, from 8.9 percent in 2019 to 9.7 percent in 2020.³ The global Gini index increased by a little more than 0.5 points in 2020, from a pre-COVID projection of 61.9 to an estimated 62.6. This increase in global poverty and inequality is the largest observed since 1990 and likely the largest rise since World War II (World Bank, 2022).⁴


3. World Bank Poverty and Inequality Platform—March 2024 update. <https://pip.worldbank.org/home#home>.

4. World Bank. *Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2022: Correcting Course*. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1893-6. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO.

Following the widespread recession in 2020, economies around the world started to recover in 2021 and extreme poverty levels were lower than pre-pandemic levels in the more prosperous regions of the world by 2022. For the world, however, global poverty was still marginally above pre-pandemic levels by 2022, though on a declining trend. An estimated 23 million more people were living in extreme poverty in 2022, compared to 2019.⁵

In 2022, 6 in 10 extreme poor lived in Sub-Saharan Africa. Trends suggest that the economic recovery from the pandemic was uneven and slower for Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, extreme poverty rose by 19 million (34%) in the Democratic Republic of Congo and by 6.4 million (10%) in Nigeria. At the USD 3.65 and USD 6.85 poverty lines, the global poverty rates in 2022 are lower than the levels recorded in 2019. This result is consistent with the recovery being faster in more prosperous regions, considering that Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for a smaller share of the global poor at these higher lines compared to the extreme poverty line.⁶

FIGURE 2. Regional and country distribution of the extreme poor population in 2022 (poverty line USD 2.15, 2017 PPP)



Source: Authors' calculations from Poverty and Inequality Platform.


5. World Bank Poverty and Inequality Platform—March 2024 update. <https://pip.worldbank.org/home#home>.

6. See: <https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/opendata/march-2024-global-poverty-update-from-the-world-bank--first-esti>.

Global Hunger Trends also show limited and uneven recovery after the pandemic

After the pandemic, there has been limited recovery in terms of levels of global hunger.⁷ Global hunger, measured by the prevalence of undernourishment (SDG Indicator 2.1.1), remained unchanged from 2021 to 2022 but was still far above pre-COVID-19-pandemic levels, affecting around 9.2 percent of the world population in 2022 compared with 7.9 percent in 2019. It is estimated that between 691 and 783 million people in the world faced hunger in 2022. Considering the midrange (about 735 million), 122 million more people faced hunger in 2022 than in 2019, before the pandemic (Figure 3).

FIGURE 3. Prevalence and millions of undernourished



Source: FAO 2023.

The slow change in hunger between 2021 and 2022 at the global level hides substantial differences at the regional and subregional levels. While progress was made towards reducing hunger in Asia and in Latin America, hunger was still on the rise in Western Asia, the Caribbean, and all subregions of Africa. A much larger proportion of the population in Africa faces hunger compared to the other regions of the world—20 percent compared with 8.5 percent in Asia, 6.5 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 7.0 percent in Oceania.

By 2030, almost 600 million people will be chronically undernourished, and hunger is expected to rise in Africa. This is about 119 million more than in a scenario in which neither the pandemic nor the war in Ukraine had occurred, and around 23 million more than if the war in Ukraine had not happened. Most progress is expected to occur in Asia, whereas no progress is foreseen in Latin America and the Caribbean, and hunger is projected to increase

7. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2023. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023. Urbanization, agrifood systems transformation and healthy diets across the rural–urban continuum*. Rome, FAO.

significantly in Africa by 2030. Challenges in Africa reflect high levels of extreme poverty, fragility and likelihood of climate shocks and food crisis.

Similarly, the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity at the global level (SDG Indicator 2.1.2) remains above pre-pandemic levels.⁸ Following a sharp increase from 2019 to 2020, the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity at the global level remained unchanged for the second year in a row but was still far above the pre-pandemic level of 25.3 percent. About 29.6 percent of the global population—2.4 billion people—were moderately or severely food insecure in 2022, 391 million more than in 2019.

Various intertwined crises are stalling progress in alleviating extreme poverty and boosting prosperity and fighting hunger

Slow growth prospects, high inflation, and high government debt are slowing recovery and progress. While several large lower-middle and low-income countries have upgraded economic growth forecasts, domestic vulnerabilities and fragility are dampening growth in many other low-income countries. After the pandemic, persistent high inflation has increased costs of living and deterred investment in many settings. Elevated levels of government debt are limiting the space for government development policies.⁹

Fragility and conflict are on the rise, hindering growth, poverty reduction and food security. Alarming rises in conflict-related deaths were seen across various nations, including Ukraine, Ethiopia, Mali, and Myanmar. The conflict in the Middle East is leading to significant human and economic losses, and risks to impact the whole region. Other markers of conflict, beyond deaths, underscore similar worrying trends. For instance, the number of people worldwide belonging to forcibly displaced populations reached a historic high of 108 million in 2022, compared to 45 million a decade ago. Today, more than 1 in 74 people worldwide remain forcibly displaced, almost 90 percent of them in low- and middle-income countries. Already before the start of the pandemic, poverty was increasingly concentrated in low-growth and fragile countries.¹⁰

Climate change and extreme weather events will exacerbate pre-existing vulnerabilities. Already today, the poorest are most exposed and most vulnerable to the negative impacts of weather-related shocks. Millions of households are pushed into or kept in poverty by natural disasters every year. Weather shocks also induce suboptimal coping responses such as cutting food consumption and can lead to market disruptions which can also negatively impact nutrition and food security. Higher temperatures are already diminishing productivity in Africa and Latin America, and will further depress economic growth, especially in the poorest regions of the world. Climate change is expected to impact agricultural productivity, food prices, and therefore the availability and cost of food in various regions of the world.

8. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2023. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023. Urbanization, agrifood systems transformation and healthy diets across the rural–urban continuum*. Rome, FAO.

9. See: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects>.

10. See: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/publication/fragility-conflict-on-the-front-lines-fight-against-poverty>.

2. EVIDENCE ON POLICIES TO TACKLE POVERTY AND HUNGER SUSTAINABLY

2.1. Policies to tackle poverty

In this subsection we summarize evidence on policies that can help increase incomes of the poorer groups in a country and reduce poverty in a sustainable way. The focus is on areas that can help increase the poor's capacity to generate income and reduce their vulnerability to shocks. Though not elaborated in this note, fundamental policies such as macro-economic stability, rule or law, or business environment, are necessary to sustain inclusive growth. The areas discussed below emphasize the role of government spending to build the assets of the poor (e.g., human capital) and their ability to use those assets to generate income (e.g., labour income) which would allow for a sustainable process of poverty reduction and would strengthen the link between economic growth and inclusion. More concretely, we organize the summary of the evidence into 3 main buckets: (1) fiscal policies that have high value; (2) policies that support well-functioning labour and land markets as they are key assets of the poor; (3) policies that can help with household risk management (Figure 4).

FIGURE 4. Policies areas to grow households capacity to generate income and reduce poverty sustainably



High value and efficient fiscal policies

World Bank (2022) includes a comprehensive summary of the evidence about high-value government policy choices that can support poverty reduction and accelerate post-pandemic recovery.¹¹ In a constrained fiscal space, focusing on high-value policies becomes even more important. The highest-value policies are often those with long-run impacts. Selecting and protecting high-value spending and tax policies are essential to

11. This summary on high-value fiscal policies comes from the World Bank, Poverty and Shared Prosperity Report (2022). The report highlights that policymakers assessing the impact of any given fiscal policy on poverty must seek answers to two key questions: (i) Who is benefiting from or paying for a given fiscal policy and to what degree? and (ii) What is the value of this spending in terms of its long-term benefits for beneficiaries, nonbeneficiaries, and government revenue? Answers to both questions are needed to properly assess the full set of welfare impacts. This information helps governments choose policies. For the second question, the concept of the marginal value of public funds (MVPF), a systematic way of determining this value. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/poverty-and-shared-prosperity>.

ensuring that fiscal policy maximizes its welfare impact. In that sense: (1) policies that improve early life outcomes are generally of high value, across many contexts; (2) policies that bring transformative growth tend to be of high value; and (3) spending to address market failures is often of higher value than subsidizing behavior in the absence of positive externalities.

(i) Policies that improve child outcomes are often of high value, across contexts

Investing in a child’s early years can be transformative, potentially setting the stage for a lifetime of higher earnings if effectively implemented. A welfare analysis examining 133 policy changes in the United States over the past 50 years reveals that spending on programs enhancing low-income children’s health and educational outcomes generally yields higher value compared to programs focused on improving outcomes for adults. In addition, a recent review of over 50 studies on preprimary education across a variety of Low-Income Countries (LICs) and Middle-Income Countries (MICs) indicate that preprimary education investments often result in significant improvements in children’s cognitive and noncognitive skills. Additionally, evaluations of preprimary investments and certain structured pedagogical initiatives demonstrate substantial learning gains relative to their costs.

Several reviews of the evidence on non-contributory cash transfers to individuals and households in low- and middle-income countries indicate a significant role in reducing poverty and enhancing investments in children’s human capital. For instance, Bastagli et al. (2018) conducted a review on the impact of non-contributory cash transfers in low- and middle-income countries, covering literature spanning 15 years from 2000 to 2015. The authors assessed evidence regarding the impact of cash transfers on thirty-five indicators across six outcome areas including monetary poverty, education, health, and nutrition. In most studies, cash transfers contributed to progress in the selected indicators as intended by policymakers. Despite variations in the size and strength of the underlying evidence base for each outcome and indicator, this finding remains consistent across all outcome areas.¹² An example of such program is Bolsa Família Program provides an example of an instrumental social welfare initiative that proved effective in addressing key poverty and inequality needs in Brazil by providing financial assistance to the nation’s most impoverished families. **Yet, the value of the cash transfers, depends on the return to beneficiaries’ subsequent investments in, for example, children’s education; on the impacts of transfers on economic activity in the local economy; and on the ability of the government to capture through taxes a share of any income growth that results from higher human capital such as educational attainment.**¹³

(ii) Policies that bring transformative economic growth tend to be of high value

Government spending that puts individuals and economies onto a higher growth path are high value. Examples of such policies are investments in research and development

12. Bastagli F., Hagen-Sanker J., Harman L., Barca V., Sturge G., Schmidt T. The impact of cash transfers: a review of the evidence from low- and middle-income countries. *Journal of social policy*. 2019.

13. World Bank. *Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2022: Correcting Course*. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1893-6. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO.

(R&D) and infrastructure. For instance, evidence from the Green Revolution highlights that investing in agricultural Research and Development (R&D) can benefit technology adopters, support agricultural growth, school investments, capital accumulation, and reductions in fertility and migration. The benefits extend beyond the technology adopters, including lower food prices, environmental advantages from reduced land use, and an accelerated pace of structural transformation. Similarly, infrastructure investments can also yield significant impacts on growth and accelerate structural transformation which can support poverty reduction. Research has found that improvements in rural connectivity can support agricultural income growth. Similarly, infrastructure projects aiming to enhance urban commuting can have a high value given their cost. Direct beneficiaries utilizing expanded or improved public transit lines can experience reduced travel times, translating into monetary benefits. Indirect beneficiaries may also exist, as congestion decreases, leading to reduced air pollution and travel time for non-transit users. These improvements in urban commuting can support a better allocation of workers to more productive jobs.

(iii) Policies that address market failures are better than subsidies

Spending that directly addresses market failures is often more cost-effective in the long run, and therefore of higher value, than subsidizing private behavior—in the absence of a positive externality, which is the typical justification for a subsidy.

Reorienting spending away from subsidies to more targeted forms of social protection will have a substantial impact on those who need it most. Subsidies may appear to be a solution to the current challenge of rising food and energy prices and their impacts on the poor. Subsidies can also be politically popular because the benefits tend to be widely distributed. However, this popularity makes subsidies an expensive way of targeting support to poor households. Fiscal incidence analysis across low- and middle-income countries shows that about half of spending on energy subsidies goes to the richest 20 percent, who consume more energy and receive larger per capita benefits.¹⁴

Input subsidies, such as fertilizer subsidies, increase agricultural production in the short run but can carry long-run costs to the natural resource base, distort incentives, and dissuade farmers from making long-run investments in productivity. Subsidizing input prices may maintain production in the short run, but it does not address the root causes of market inefficiencies or a lack of knowledge. A farmer's investment to increase productivity is based not only on current and forecasted input prices but also on current and forecasted output prices, knowledge on how best to invest, and access to credit, insurance, and labour markets. Addressing these constraints on production should bring larger gains overall, and some interventions will also have immediate payoffs on production and productivity.

14. World Bank. *Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2022: Correcting Course*. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1893-6. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO.

Policies to support well-functioning labour and land markets

Well-functioning markets have the effect of allowing resources—assets—to be allocated to the most productive use. In this section we focus on two markets which relate to the main two assets of the poor: labour and land.

(i) Policies related to labour markets

The private sector creates jobs.¹⁵ The role of government is to ensure that the conditions are in place for strong private-sector-led growth, analyze job market conditions and outcomes, and to remove or mitigate the constraints that prevent the creation of more and better jobs. Government can fulfill this role through ensuring that the fundamental aspects of macroeconomic stability, business environment, and rule of law are there.

In addition, Governments can help setting priorities to increase the ability of the labour market to create jobs. As economies evolve and new challenges emerge, so too must the policies aimed at fostering employment, ensuring they remain relevant and effective over time. This dynamic nature of policy design allows for the anticipation of future labour market trends and the preemptive addressing of potential obstacles to job creation and quality improvement. Effective job strategies, leading to sustained labour productivity enhancements that are essential for fostering economic growth, reducing poverty, and ensuring inclusive outcomes in long term depend heavily on the essential job transitions:

- *Sectoral Transition:* The transition from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors is vital for economic growth, marked by substantial productivity gaps. In low-income countries, the share of employment in non-agricultural sectors remains minor compared to high-income countries, highlighting the growth potential through sectoral transition. **Removing structural barriers, such as improving access to credit and resolving land tenure issues, can facilitate this transition.**
- *Spatial Transition:* The move from rural to urban areas is associated with higher wages and productivity, yet the share of urban workers in low-income countries is much lower than in high-income countries. **Addressing skill mismatches and improving rural education quality can enhance urban employment opportunities can support spatial transitions.**
- *Occupational Transition:* The high skill premium and the smaller share of skilled workers in low-income countries compared to high-income countries suggest significant growth opportunities through occupational transition. **Investing in education and training to increase the skilled labour supply is essential for meeting the demand in more productive sectors.**

15. World Bank. 2012. World Development Report 2013: Jobs. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/c7bc435a-d635-5136-aacf-7cf0f5f3c6cf>.

- *Organizational Transition*: Exporting activities, indicative of organizational transition, are significantly more productive than non-exporting activities but involve only a small fraction of the workforce. **Reducing the cost of formal employment and encouraging technology adoption can facilitate this transition, highlighting the productivity potential through organizational transition.**

Completing these job transitions is key to closing massive income gaps and combating poverty. Evidence suggests that poverty rates among workers are significantly lower on the advanced side of each transition, indicating that progress in these transitions can significantly reduce poverty rates by shifting people to more productive activities.¹⁶

(ii) Policies on land markets

Land is an important asset for the poor, providing a foundation for economic activity and the functioning of markets, such as the credit market, as well as nonmarket institutions. Institutions and policies related to land usually reflect historical institutional processes and various market imperfections. Policy advice needs to consider the complexity of these issues and the historical and political implications of policy interventions to minimize negative impacts. Research has long pointed to the need for a careful and differentiated approach as a precondition for making clear policy recommendations regarding land that can help improve both efficiency and equity. Therefore, this section highlights the importance of reviewing the functioning of land markets and provides a few overarching evidence-based recommendations.¹⁷

First, **providing tenure security for private, customary, and common land rights** can improve the welfare of the poor, particularly by improving the asset base of those whose land rights are often neglected, such as women, vulnerable groups, and Indigenous Peoples.

Second, **facilitating the exchange and distribution of land**, whether as an asset or for current services, at low cost through markets as well as through nonmarket channels, is central to expediting land access by productive but land-poor producers and, once the economic environment is right, the development of financial markets that rely on the use of land as collateral.

Third, **promoting and contributing to socially desirable land allocation and utilization. Appropriate incentives for sustainable land use** are also required to avoid negative externalities and irreversible degradation of nonrenewable natural and cultural resources.

16. For more information see <https://datatopics.worldbank.org/jobsdiagnostics/>.

17. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/land#1>; Holden, S. T., Otsuka, K., & Place, F. M. (2010). Land markets and poverty in perspective. In *The Emergence of Land Markets in Africa* (pp. 273-296). Routledge; Deininger, k. (2003). *Land policies for growth and poverty reduction*. A publication of the World Bank and Oxford University Press.

Policies that increase households' resilience and risk management

There is vast evidence showing that transitory shocks can have permanent effects on household welfare. Assets losses and income shocks lead people to respond in inefficient ways. Catastrophic shocks, such as a climate event or health crises among income earners who do not have insurance, can reduce asset holdings leading to poverty traps. This section focuses on risk management at the household level. It is important to note that actions are needed to manage risks also at the macro and firm-level. Climate change adaptive actions such as resilient infrastructure and early warning systems are also essential.

Risk management at the household level needs to combine the capacity to prepare for risk with the ability to cope afterward, considering how the up-front cost of preparation compares with its probable benefit.¹⁸ A strong risk management strategy would include four components.

First, acquiring **knowledge** and thereby reducing uncertainties that people face when confronting risks and pursuing opportunities is the initial component of risk management. Policies in this area encompass **basic literacy and learning, media, and community campaigns, as well as teaching preventive health in schools, or providing access to mobile technologies.**

Second, **protection** includes any action that decreases the probability and magnitude of negative outcomes or increase the likelihood and scale of positive outcomes. This can include **investments in resilient infrastructure, preventive healthcare, assistance with migration and access to labour and other markets, regulations to ensure equal property rights (especially for women), and policies promoting gender parity.**

Third, **insurance** can help mitigate the impact of adverse shocks. This may involve **index insurance, reducing remittance costs, promoting financial inclusion for the poor, implementing health insurance, pensions, and unemployment insurance.**

The final component of risk management, **coping**, involves deploying the knowledge, protection, and insurance resources acquired during the preparation phase. Policies can include supporting **self- and community-targeted income support, transfers, or means-targeted assistance. Adaptive social protection systems are crucial for providing adequate coping mechanisms and reducing the likelihood of responses that may lead to food insecurity or push people back into poverty.**

2.2. Policies to reduce food insecurity and hunger sustainably

The policies discussed previously are also central to combat hunger and food insecurity. First, higher household incomes are associated with higher levels of consumption, and

18. World Bank. 2013. World Development Report 2014: Risk and Opportunity—Managing Risk for Development. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/8b0ce20f-98e5-5a1b-a069-9ddc42addc76>.

reduced likelihood of food insecurity. Lower levels of extreme poverty are highly correlated with lower levels of hunger.¹⁹ Moreover, fiscal policies that build assets of the poor help increase levels of human capital, including better nutritional outcomes. Finally, adequate risk management is central to reduce suboptimal coping strategies such as cutting food consumption or preventive health care that can undermine nutritional outcomes.

In this subsection, we summarize some additional elements to consider in scaling crisis prevention, preparedness, and response related to combating hunger.

Investing in national plans to better respond to food and nutrition security crises.

Food and price crises are likely to increase in frequency as climate-induced weather extremes, conflict, and other drivers remain protracted. Greater crisis preparedness is imperative to prevent and mitigate emergency and famine conditions as well as to limit the impacts on achieving SDG 2 Zero Hunger. These preparedness plans support governments to take more systematic and coordinated approaches to food and nutrition security crises.²⁰ More generally, develop and strengthen emergency response mechanisms to address acute food crises promptly and efficiently, including the provision of humanitarian aid and coordination of relief efforts is key.

Adaptive Social Protection (ASP) systems can also allow countries to build capacity to prepare for, cope with, and adapt to food crises. ASP systems build on existing national programs and digital delivery investments and link to the Preparedness Plans. Despite progress, social protection systems face significant gaps in the coverage and financing required to address food and nutrition shortfalls. Evidence supports the potential of adaptive approaches, including benefits for women’s economic empowerment and food security. The ASP systems can be further scaled up in close collaboration with a range of social protection stakeholders by: i) investing in digital delivery systems that enable anticipatory response to shocks and disasters, including as identified by the Preparedness Plans; ii) supporting productive opportunities for the poorest by combining basic social safety nets with training, coaching, and earning opportunities; iii) building on social protection platforms to strengthen health, nutrition, and childcare services for poor recipient households, e.g., micronutrient supplements for pregnant and lactating women; and iv) addressing financing gaps through improved disaster risk financing and complementary action for subsidy reforms.

The various risks affecting food access, availability, utilization, and sustainability underscores the pressing need to transform food systems in a climate smart way.

19. Siddiqui F, Salam RA, Lassi ZS, Das JK. The Intertwined Relationship Between Malnutrition and Poverty. *Front Public Health*. 2020; and references therein.

20. The WB—in close partnership with humanitarian and development actors under GAFS, Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC), national governments, United Nations (UN) agencies, and donor partners—is supporting the development of preparedness plans across twenty-five countries. Most of these are FCS or identified as a hunger hotspot, including Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen. Further efforts are being undertaken to scale the adoption and implementation of Preparedness Plans to over 60 countries by 2030 in four ways: i) bolstering the operational readiness of the WB FNS portfolio to respond to a triggered Preparedness Plan via pre-arranged programming and enabling the timely access to crisis risk financing; ii) establishing new Joint Monitoring Reports (JMRs) to enable FNS crisis risk monitoring at higher frequency in all countries with Preparedness Plans; iii) expanding the capabilities of the GAFS Global Food and Nutrition Security Dashboard to “live track” financing and responses across humanitarian and development partners when a Preparedness Plan is triggered; and iv) putting in place dedicated global/regional support arrangements with GAFS, GNAFC, and Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to bolster national FNS responses when Plans are triggered.


This effort should encompass immediate responses as well as medium and long-term strategic planning to address the underlying causes of the crisis through policy reforms aimed at enhancing fiscal policies to better address food security vulnerabilities, scaling up climate finance within the agrifood sector, and promoting circular economy principles to ensure environmental sustainability alongside food security. In addition, continuing to promote agricultural development and investment in rural areas to enhance food production, improve farming techniques, and increase the income of small-scale farmers is very important.

3. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR IDENTIFYING POLICY PRIORITIES AND GAPS AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL

The asset-based framework

To organize the discussion and help identify relevant policies, this section presents a simple framework that relies on an asset-based approach as a building block. The main elements of the framework are presented in Figure 5.²¹ At the macroeconomic level, incomes and poverty are influenced by variables such as commodity prices, external conditions, the importance of trade in the economy, the sectoral composition of growth, and fiscal structure and capacity. At the microeconomic level, the capacity of households to generate income depends on the assets they own or have access to, the existing returns to these assets, and how intensively they are used. The assets may include human capital, financial capital, social capital, and natural capital, such as land, soil, forests, and water. Finally, the income generation capacity of households is complemented by nonmarket income, that is, transfers from private sources (remittances, for instance) and public sources (social assistance, for example).

FIGURE 5. Growing incomes at the bottom requires policies to invest in the productive capacity of the poor



Source: Lopez-Calva and Rodriguez-Castelan (2019).

21. See: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/5c4013fe-d71d-5109-956c-8fb441096a66>.

This framework integrates both macroeconomic and microeconomic elements, wherein growth and the incidence of growth can be understood as jointly determined processes.

In the short run, the distribution of household assets is largely given, and variables such as prices, the composition of economic growth, and fiscal transfers will play a more significant role in driving household incomes and reducing poverty. In the medium and long term, however, the level and distribution of assets, along with the returns on the assets that reflect their productivity, will be the primary drivers of household incomes and poverty reduction. In this sense, if poorer households possess lower productive capacity, there will be an upper bound to the potential for income growth and overall economic growth.

Shocks and cyclical conditions will also impact income and poverty levels. For instance, unemployment could prevent individuals from generating income from labor; inflation may distort the relative returns to assets and induce misallocations; and the fiscal capacity of governments to respond to shocks could limit the countercyclical role of transfers, while households may rely more on private transfers during challenging times.

This framework is also useful for assessing the impacts of climate change on poverty.

Firstly, climate change, manifested through factors like increased hot days, intense rainfall, and storms, places substantial economic burdens on individuals who often rely on natural capital (e.g., agriculture) for income generation; these individuals are more likely to be poor and live in specific locations. Secondly, the impacts of climate change on well-being hinge on the assets of households and the specific circumstances in which these households operate. For instance, households with higher educational attainment (i.e., possessing greater human capital) are more able to adjust their livelihood activities, while those with savings (i.e., increased financial capital) demonstrate greater resilience in re-establishing businesses.

This framework can be expanded to evaluate development priorities aimed at reducing the risks of food insecurity.

First, investing in assets such as human capital is essential for supporting improved nutritional outcomes and decreasing the likelihood of food insecurity in the longer term. Moreover, an overall increase in households' capacity to generate income and exit extreme poverty in a sustainable manner is crucial, as it is also connected to diminished risks of hunger and malnutrition.

For a specific country, interventions in specific policy areas can be assessed for their potential impact on the income-generating capacity of the poor or near-poor—

and, therefore, their capacity to contribute to growth—through asset holdings and accumulation, the intensity of asset use, the impact on the returns to assets, and the implications of nonmarket income (public and private transfers) for equity and efficiency. This approach, using the above framework, can provide guidance to policymakers on key questions to be considered in the formulation of interventions.

Bussolo and Lopez-Calva provide a matrix (table 1) that outlines the transmission channels through which interventions in five broad policy areas can affect the capacity of the poor and those at the bottom of the income distribution to contribute to growth by influencing their asset accumulation, asset use, and returns to assets.

These five policy channels may contain many specific policy interventions. The matrix represents an attempt to structure the conversation around the elements of the proposed framework, and

it does this by providing questions rather than answers in each cell. The main reason why the different cells are presented as questions is because the answers are necessarily context specific and require analysis of the specific interventions under consideration. Responding to these questions may also be demanding in terms of data requirements.

Policy areas to reduce poverty can be organized into 5 main groups: (1) macroeconomic management; (2) fiscal policies, including tax structure and spending; (3) the institutional capacity at various levels of government to deliver good-quality services efficiently; (4) effective risk management instruments and systems; and (5) the capacity to enable well-functioning markets and a favorable business environment.

TABLE 1. Policy matrix for implementing the asset-based approach

Policy area	Assets	Intensity of use	Prices	Transfers	Sustainability
1. Macroeconomic fundamentals	Is the macro environment inducing investments in asset accumulation by the poor and less well-off?	Is unemployment affecting the poor and less well-off disproportionately? Is this because of the sector composition of GDP growth? What can be done to boost employment at the bottom?	Is inflation distorting relative prices and inducing the misallocation of resources? Is it affecting net borrowers in the economy, typically the poor and less well-off?		Is the macro environment allowing the poor and less well-off to save and accumulate assets?
2. Fiscal systems	Are in-kind transfers sufficient to guarantee asset accumulation by the poor and less well-off (human capital and health, for instance)?	Does the tax structure affect work incentives among individuals? The decisions of firms to hire and invest? Are countercyclical components in the fiscal system being adequately targeted and financed? Are public investments following correct evaluations of long-term productive impacts?	Are fiscal systems inducing inefficiencies through their effects on prices? Are fiscal systems progressive in providing investment space to the poor and less well-off?	Are transfers for social assistance well targeted? Do they distinguish between the chronic and transitory poor?	Is a prudent fiscal policy ensuring that the fiscal burden does not fall disproportionately on future generations? Is it crowding out the private sector, particularly small and medium enterprises, by distorting the portfolio decisions of banks?
3. Institutional capacity, service delivery	Are the good quality services provided to the poor and less well-off sufficient to guarantee access to economic opportunities? Are institutional conditions appropriate for the protection of social and natural capital?	Does infrastructure, transport, or connectivity enhance the capacity to use assets more intensively? Have markets been established for the sustainable use of natural capital?	Do prices reflect the relative scarcity of resources? Are the returns to assets affected by the quality of publicly provided complementary inputs?	Is there sufficient institutional capacity to manage transfer programs in a transparent way?	Are systems in place to ensure monitoring and evaluation and systematic improvements in the services delivered to the poor and less well-off? Are certain groups systematically excluded from services? Why?

Policy area	Assets	Intensity of use	Prices	Transfers	Sustainability
4. Risk management	Are the assets of the poor and less well-off being depleted by shocks or overexposed to shocks? Are the portfolio decisions of the poorer groups being affected by exposure to risks?	Are extensive and intensive risks leading to an inefficiently low use of specific assets, particularly those of the poor and less well-off?	Do prices or returns appropriately reflect risk, or are they inducing inefficient risk taking?	Are transfers or public insurance mechanisms inducing moral hazard by, for example, providing commercial risk guarantees to investors at the expense of taxpayers?	Is exposure to risk threatening the capacity of the system to survive in the long term?
5. Well-functioning markets, business environment	Are markets excluding the poor and less well-off from access to financing or access to investments in specific assets? Is market power preventing the operation or growth of small and medium enterprises through high costs for adopting new technology and undertaking new investments among the poor?	Do markets allocate resources for the most efficient and equitable use? Do markets provide incentives for economic participation among less privileged households? How do the rule of law, regulations, and the availability and quality of public goods induce higher intensity in the use of household assets?	Do price and factor rewards reflect undistorted conditions? Are there gaps in the returns for the poor and less well-off that could be corrected if markets were functioning more adequately?	Are fiscal transfers and subsidies distorting competitive conditions? Is market power reflected in the allocation of fiscal subsidies?	Are market imperfections generating inequality traps and threatening social cohesion in the long term? Are key regulations being captured by powerful actors, distorting the regulatory capacity of the state and negatively affecting investors and consumers?

Source: Bussolo, Maurizio, and Luis F. Lopez-Calva. *Shared Prosperity: Paving the Way in Europe and Central Asia*. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0230-0. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO.

4. THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF AID FLOWS AND ITS IMPACT ON AID EFFECTIVENESS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GLOBAL ALLIANCE

This section shifts focus towards existing challenges and opportunities for leveraging resources more effectively to fight poverty and enhance food security. Building on the comprehensive strategies to sustainably tackle poverty and hunger discussed in the preceding sections, along with the proposed framework for identifying policy priorities and gaps, it becomes imperative to explore the funding underpinnings. The implementation of innovative policy solutions requires a robust financial framework capable of navigating the fragmented global aid landscape effectively incorporating domestic resource mobilization with external funding sources, including concessional funding. It is key to promoting a greater balance and complementarity between leveraged and unleveraged approaches to aid delivery. The section also discusses the need for innovative solutions to mobilize scarce concessional funds, to enhance collaboration and partnerships between vertical funds and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to optimize the impact of aid delivery. By emphasizing strategic approach to mobilization of resources, the discussion below provides insights to create an effective financing framework to forge a path towards achieving the aspects of SDGs discussed in the note.

The global aid system has evolved significantly in the last two decades, leading to challenges for recipient countries. This includes increased complexity due to over two hundred donor agencies, fragmentation of financial flows, limited direct funding through national budgets (only 40 percent), and ineffective leveraging of resources. These trends, driven by donor preferences and geopolitical factors, complicate the alignment of national development goals with global challenges, lacking a clear framework for resource allocation. The impact is most severe in the poorest countries, which struggle with institutional capacity and face inefficiencies in managing multiple donor relationships.²²

The last two decades have witnessed significant proliferation of donors and donor channels, adding more complexity to the aid landscape. The number of entities providing official finance more than doubled between 2002-06 and 2017-21 (Annex Figure A1 and A2). This growth reflects the rise of new donors and the creation of new institutions, with the number of official finance providers rising from an average of 62 to 112 during the same period. This proliferation has placed additional strain on the implementation capacities of low-income countries. Governments of some, even relatively small, countries often manage hundreds of donor agencies, drastically increased over the last two decades. This increase in donor entities complicates coordination, increases costs, and stretches recipient countries' capabilities to manage diverse requirements such as audits, environmental assessments, and financial reporting. Additionally, the multitude of agencies can dilute policy leverage and lead to conflicting policies, making donor administration and coordination increasingly complex.

The proliferation of aid channels has also led to increased fragmentation in aid. This fragmentation is evident in both the growing number of donor-funded transactions and the financial scale of aid commitments and projects (Annex Figure A3). From 2000 to 2021, the volume of Official Financial Flows (OFF) grew by 218 percent in real terms, while the number of transactions surged by 427 percent. ODA grants, in particular, expanded from 36,830 transactions (72 percent) in 2000 to 236,797 transactions (88 percent) in 2021. The average size of ODA grants has significantly decreased over this period by half, falling from USD 1.7 million to USD 0.8 million. Additionally, the average size of equity investments dropped more drastically, decreasing from USD 11.8 million to USD 3.6 million. This overall reduction in grant sizes is particularly concerning for countries with weaker capacities, as the higher transaction costs associated with smaller grants impose a disproportionate burden on them. Efforts to address aid fragmentation in countries with lower institutional capacities have yielded mixed results. An analysis linking public sector management capacity to donor activities indicates

22. Typology of aid flows:

- Official Financial Flows (OFF) consist of Official Development Assistance and Other Official Flows.
- Official Development Assistance (ODA) consists of resource flows (grants, loans and equity) to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients (developing countries) and to multilateral agencies which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; and (c) at concessional financial terms. Until 2018, loans were concessional if their Grant Element was at least 25 percent (calculated at a 10 percent discount rate of 10 percent). In addition to financial flows, Technical Cooperation is included in ODA. Equity provided by the official sector excludes Foreign Direct Investment, included under private flows.
- Other Official Flows (OOF) consist of transactions by the official sector with countries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients which do not meet the conditions for eligibility as ODA, either because they are not primarily aimed at development, or because they have less than the required grant element.
- Private Flows consist of flows at market terms financed out of external private sector resources (i.e., changes in holdings of private long-term assets held by residents of the reporting country) and private grants (i.e., grants by non-governmental organizations and other private bodies, net of subsidies received from the official sector).

that in countries with very low to medium implementation capacity, donors tend to finance larger projects on average, thus limiting administrative burden on governments.

While Official Financial Flows (OFF) to developing countries have more than tripled, the funds increasingly circumvent recipient government budgets. Despite a more than threefold increase in Official Financial Flows (OFF) to developing countries, there has been a significant shift away from channeling these funds through recipient government budgets (Annex Figure A4). By 2021, about 80 percent of projects were implemented by non-government entities, mainly through project-type interventions. Approximately one-fourth of these transactions in the last decade were channeled through NGOs, with over two-thirds of these executed by donor-based NGOs. More than half of the funds circumvent country budgets, utilizing channels such as donor governments, multilateral organizations, and NGOs, which challenges the effectiveness of aid. In contrast, the International Development Association (IDA) directly allocated 92 percent of its funds to government agencies. However, budget support constituted only about 10 percent of overall OFF between 2012 and 2021. Over two-thirds Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors channeled less than 10 percent of their OFF through governments. In contrast, some non-DAC donors allocated over 70 percent of their financing directly to government agencies. Bilateral donors frequently utilized NGOs for implementing one-third of their activities, with three-quarters of these through donor-based NGOs. This pattern highlights a general tendency to bypass recipient government systems. See Annex 2 for more details.

MDBs channel most financing through government agencies. MDB projects adhere to rigorous fiduciary standards, environmental, and social safeguards, with procurement and financial management standards ensuring effective fiduciary control. This not only facilitates successful implementation but also enhances the capacity of borrower countries and develops their systems or markets through adherence to MDB standards and policies. Most of large MDBs channel 90 percent or more through government agencies. In contrast, United Nations agencies and Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs) channel about half of their financing through governments.²³ Donors often bypass government channels for reasons such as the need for quick, visible results and to mitigate reputational risk. This is particularly relevant for bilateral partners, which links funding to specific outputs. Factors influencing the use of government channels include Public Financial Management (PFM), rule of law, human rights, political governance, and macroeconomic and fiduciary risks.

In addition, significant growth has been observed in earmarked aid.²⁴ Aid earmarked for specific sectors or themes, particularly through vertical platforms, has seen significant growth (Annex Figure A5). From 2000 to 2021, vertical platforms' grant commitments increased by an average of 27 percent annually. While vertical platforms provided more ODA

23. FIFs, established under United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change mechanisms and utilizing various implementing agencies, experience high transaction costs. These costs stem from extensive information and legal requirements, heavy secretariat involvement in project cycles, and the necessity of re-accrediting implementing entities every five years. The Green Climate Fund (GCF), for instance, uses a wide array of 114 agencies, including development finance institutions, local agencies, and civil society organizations, contributing to these elevated transaction costs.

24. In this context, it can be useful to distinguish between "horizontal" platforms, such as multilateral development banks and other organizations that allocate resources based on country needs, and "vertical" platforms that are focused on specific sectors or themes.

grants to developing countries than horizontal platforms from 2010-2019, this changed with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Horizontal platforms boosted their ODA grant financing by 50 percent compared to 2019, surpassing vertical platforms (USD 15.3 billion versus USD 12.3 billion). This trend continued into 2021, with slight increases in grant commitments from both types of platforms. Earmarked funding approaches offer both benefits and drawbacks. Vertical approaches, effective in tackling specific issues like HIV/AIDS or climate change, can achieve economies of scale but typically operate as unleveraged facilities, directly passing donor funds to recipients, limiting resource mobilization. In contrast, horizontal platforms like IDA work as leveraged facilities, amplifying every donor dollar into four times the financing, enabling greater resource mobilization and potentially larger long-term impacts.

Recommendations to address these issues

First, it is important to strive for balance and complementarity between leveraged and unleveraged approaches to aid delivery. This means finding ways to combine the advantages of both approaches while mitigating their limitations through opportunities for co-financing and partnerships between vertical funds and MDBs. By doing so, urgent financing needs can be met, economies of scale can be achieved, and scarce resources can be effectively mobilized for the benefit of developing countries.

Second, in a global aid landscape with increasing fragmentation and competition for resources, as well as significant global challenges that demand innovative solutions to mobilize scarce concessional funds, collaboration and partnerships between vertical and horizontal platforms are crucial. One potential option to address this need is the optimization of earmarked funds through the country-based model of MDBs, such as in the case of the International Development Association (IDA). IDA's hybrid financial model has the unique capability to leverage each dollar of donor contribution by a multiple of 3 or 4, thereby expanding the overall envelope of resources available to developing countries.

Third, the Global Alliance could foster the development of a consensus to promote greater balance and complementarity between leveraged and unleveraged approaches. By integrating earmarked funds from unleveraged vertical facilities into the horizontal framework of the MDBs, it would be possible to harness the advantages of both vertical and horizontal approaches, fostering collaboration and maximizing the impact of aid efforts. This collaborative approach can help overcome the challenges posed by resource competition and fragmentation, enabling the mobilization of greater resources to tackle global development challenges like hunger and poverty reduction effectively.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

As the world grapples with the lingering impacts of multiple crises that have delayed global progress towards the SDGs, addressing global poverty, hunger, and inequality has become critically urgent. The establishment of a Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty under the G20 Presidency offers a significant opportunity to tackle these challenges, considering that many challenges hindering progress need global coordination and cooperation.

This note outlined key trends and policy options, aiming to inform both the proposed Global Alliance and the G20 Task Force's efforts to revive progress toward achieving the SDGs. It seeks to understand and address the interconnected causes of hunger and poverty, highlighting the importance of inclusive growth and reducing vulnerability to shocks.

The document underscores the importance of investing in the productive capacity of the poor as a guide to priority policies that can reduce poverty and hunger.

It highlights employment as a fundamental element of poverty reduction, calling for policies that stimulate job creation and support job transitions that can lead to higher incomes. Moreover, the need for efficient and high-value fiscal policies is key, with adaptable and well-targeted social protection systems emphasized to guard against economic shocks. Investments in the assets of the poor, access to well-functioning markets and information, are essential for a sustainable foundation for economic recovery and long-term growth. The note also highlights the importance of sustainable agricultural practices and good household risk management. These measures are crucial for ensuring food security and protecting livelihoods against climate variability.

Recognizing the global nature of poverty and hunger, the report calls for strengthened international cooperation and partnerships.

It urges G20 countries, international organizations, and the private sector to collaborate in mobilizing resources, sharing knowledge, and coordinating efforts to effectively tackle these pressing issues. By outlining a comprehensive strategy that balances economic growth with social inclusion and environmental sustainability, the note provides a roadmap for policymakers, stakeholders, and the international community to renew their commitments and intensify efforts towards achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

ANNEX A

FIGURE A1. A number of emerging economies have become top donors over the last 20 years




FIGURE A2. Rising aid flows have led to a rapid proliferation of donors and donor agencies




FIGURE A3. Increased donor proliferation has led to the fragmentation of aid flows




FIGURE A4. The majority of aid flows has bypassed government systems





FIGURE A5. The volume of funds channeled through vertical platforms increased 16-fold in the last 2 decades



ANNEX B

TABLE B1. Share of OFF volumes by implementation channels for bilateral donors, 2012–2021

	Donor government	Recipient government	Multilaterals	International NGO	NGO—other	Others and unspecified
DAC Donors						
Japan	4%	81%	7%	0%	1%	6%
Portugal	41%	41%	6%	0%	6%	5%
France	26%	38%	3%	1%	2%	30%
Iceland	25%	27%	34%	2%	7%	5%
Spain	16%	26%	13%	1%	34%	10%
New Zealand	17%	19%	14%	3%	11%	36%
Germany	19%	19%	13%	1%	6%	42%
Ireland	13%	15%	24%	10%	29%	10%
Korea	11%	14%	3%	0%	0%	72%
Italy	51%	12%	17%	1%	9%	10%
Denmark	19%	12%	26%	2%	21%	20%
Australia	19%	7%	21%	3%	8%	42%
Hungary	49%	6%	10%	1%	18%	16%
United Kingdom	23%	5%	28%	6%	10%	28%
Norway	16%	5%	32%	4%	19%	24%
Finland	18%	5%	26%	3%	19%	29%
Luxembourg	38%	5%	23%	4%	24%	6%
Sweden	34%	4%	24%	14%	12%	12%
Czech Republic	35%	4%	15%	3%	21%	21%
Switzerland	27%	4%	23%	8%	23%	15%
Belgium	41%	4%	13%	2%	18%	22%
United States	29%	4%	19%	5%	17%	26%
Netherlands	32%	3%	20%	7%	17%	22%
Canada	24%	3%	35%	7%	20%	12%
Greece	79%	2%	9%	0%	0%	9%
Austria	37%	2%	13%	2%	7%	39%
Non-DAC donors						
Slovak Republic	38%	2%	32%	2%	17%	9%
Poland	48%	0%	12%	0%	8%	32%
Slovenia	68%	0%	13%	1%	9%	99%
Qatar	1%	89%	3%	0%	5%	3%



	Donor government	Recipient government	Multilaterals	International NGO	NGO—other	Others and unspecified
Kuwait	0%	84%	0%	0%	0%	15%
Saudi Arabia	8%	72%	16%	0%	1%	3%
Croatia	24%	46%	18%	0%	1%	11%
United Arab Emirates	38%	36%	5%	0%	4%	16%
Thailand		34%	5%	0%		61%
Cyprus	3%	25%	68%	1%	1%	2%
Monaco	15%	9%	27%	6%	39%	5%
Romania	68%	8%	9%	0%	0%	15%
Latvia	34%	7%	29%	2%	6%	22%
Kazakhstan	13%	6%	76%	0%	0%	6%
Lithuania	53%	4%	18%	2%	5%	18%
Estonia	18%	0%	24%	4%	28%	25%
Türkiye	99%	0%	0%	0%		1%
Russia						
Chinese Taipei			100%			
Azerbaijan	41%		52%	0%		7%
Bulgaria						
Israel						
Liechtenstein	7%		8%	12%	67%	6%
Malta						
Timor-Leste	31%					69%

TABLE B2. Share of OFF volumes by implementation channels for horizontal and vertical multilateral donors, 2012–2021

	Donor government	Recipient government	Multilaterals	International NGOs	NGO—other	Other—unspecified
World Bank Group						
IBRD		100%				
IDA		92%	0%			8%
IFC						100%
Multilateral Development Banks						
New Development Bank		92%				8%
Asian Development Bank		88%				12%
Inter-American Development Bank		82%	2%	0%	0%	17%
African Development Bank		76%	0%			23%
Council of Europe Development Bank		68%	0%		0%	32%
Caribbean Development Bank	0%	45%	10%			44%
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		30%				70%
Islamic Development Bank	0%	24%	1%	0%	0%	75%
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank		14%	11%			75%
IDB Invest						100%
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)						100%
United Nations						
IFAD		44%				56%
Food and Agriculture Organisation		36%	64%			0%
UNDP		16%	36%		0%	47%

	Donor government	Recipient government	Multilaterals	International NGOs	NGO—other	Other—unspecified
UN Peacebuilding Fund	0%	14%	81%	2%	1%	2%
UNFPA		5%	22%		5%	68%
UNAIDS		2%	38%	1%	5%	55%
World Health Organisation			28%			72%
World Trade Organisation			100%			
International Atomic Energy Agency						
International Labour Organisation			97%			3%
UN Capital Development Fund			100%			
UN Institute for Disarmament Research			100%			
UN Women			99%			1%
UNECE						100%
UNEP						
UNHCR			3%			97%
UNICEF			22%			78%
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development			100%			
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation			100%			
UNRWA			9%			91%
WFP			65%			35%
WHO—Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan			97%			3%
World Tourism Organisation			100%			
WTO—International Trade Centre			100%			0%

	Donor government	Recipient government	Multilaterals	International NGOs	NGO—other	Other— unspecified
Financial Intermediary Funds						
Global Fund		55%	14%	8%	15%	8%
Adaptation Fund		21%	76%		1%	2%
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization		10%	81%			9%
Green Climate Fund	7%	8%	72%	1%	0%	11%
Global Environment Facility		0%	94%	4%	0%	2%
Climate Investment Funds			100%			

